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74 PEoPLE v. 'rHoJI!IAs [37 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5201. In Bank. May 1, 1951.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. HENRY THOMAS, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Judgment and Sentence-Determination of 
Degree of Offense on Plea of Guilty.-Defendant cannot suc-
cessfully urge that the court erred in failing to take evidence 
in ascertaining the degree to be first degree murder and the 
penalty death, after a plea of guilty on a murder charge, where 
the court considered the evidence of the decedent's husband 
and that taken at the preliminary hearing, which evidence 
amply established that the murder was committed during 
an attempt to commit robbery, where the defendant was not 
foreclosed from offering evidence, and where he thereafter 
stood mute when asked if he had any legal cause why sentence 
should not be pronounced. 
[2] !d.-Judgment and Sentence-Determination of Degree of 
Offense on Plea of Guilty.-A statutory hearing for the de-
termination of the degree of an offense and the punishment 
therefor, after a plea of guilty, is not governed by the same 
strict rules of procedure as a trial; it is the duty of the court 
to consider matters in aggravation as well as mitigation of the 
offense, and it may examine into the legal significance of 
established facts and consider many matters not admissible 
on the issue of guilt or innocence. 
[3] !d.-Appeal-Reduction of Punishment lmposed.-The ap-
pellate court is without authority to reduce the penalty from 
death to life imprisonment, where there is no error in the 
proceedings for the determination of the degree of murder 
and the punishment therefor after a plea of guilty to the 
charge. (Pen. Code, § 1260.) 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Siskiyou County. 
James M. Allen, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, affirmed. 
[1] See 8 Cal.Jur. 457; 15 Am.Jur. 167. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law,§ 1000; [3] Criminal 
Law, §1446. 
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by the Supreme Court, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant, Henry Thomas, having pleaded 
guilty to murder (Pen. Code, § 187) the court found the 
murder to be of the first degree, and imposed the death penalty. 
The appeal is here by operation of law. Charged with de-
fendant, was William McCain, who pleaded not guilty. Mc-
Cain was tried, found guilty, and a sentence of life imprison-
ment was imposed. Also charged with the same crime, and 
ordered held to answer at the preliminary examination was 
Joe Cooper, but what disposition has been made of the charge 
against him, if any, does not appear. 
According to the evidence taken when the degree and punish-
ment were fixed, and at the preliminary hearing, Mr. and Mrs. 
Ainsworth were managing a grocery store near Hatfield, 
Siskiyou County, California, on October 20, 1950. About 
5 :30 in the afternoon, while the Ainsworths were present in 
the store, defendant and McCain entered it, McCain in the lead. 
Defendant ordered soft drinks. McCain drew a pistol and 
stated it was a holdup. Defendant also drew a pistol. Ains-
worth grasped the barrel of the pistol held by McCain and in 
the ensuing struggle it was discharged, a bullet striking and 
wounding Mr. Merrill, who entered the store at that time. 
After McCain's gun discharged, defendant fired several shots 
from his pistol, two of which struck Mrs. Ainsworth, causing 
her death. McCain and defendant fled and were finally appre-
hended in Bakersfield. 
Defendant urges two grounds for reversal: (1) The court 
erred in failing to take evidence to ascertain the pemilty to be' 
imposed. (2) The penalty should be reduced to life imprison~ 
ment under section 1260 of the Penal Code, as amended in 
1949. (Stats. 1949, ch. 1309, § 1.) 
Defendant was held to answer following a preliminary 
examination and an information was filed against him. On 
December 4, 1950, he was arraigned and not having means to 
employ counsel, one was appointed for him-Mr. Mark M. 
Brawman. Time to plead was set for December 6, 1950, at 
his counsel's request. At that time, after a brief appearance 
in court, counsel for defendant and McCain's counsel, and 
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the district attorney retired to the judge's chambers where 
the judge said that Mr. Brawman had spoken to him in re-
gard to the possibility of defendant's avoiding the death pen-
alty by making a ''certain'' plea. The judge remarked that he 
had read the transcript of the preliminary hearing and that 
he was ''inclined'' to give the ''extreme'' penalty whether he 
pleaded guilty or not guilty. On returning to court, defendant 
pleaded guilty and December 11, 1950, was fixed as the time 
for "pronouncing judgment," later continued to December 
14, 1950, when the court announced it would hear evidence 
on the degree of the offense. The district attorney called 
decedent's husband, Ainsworth, to the stand and he testified 
to the facts relating to the killing. Defendant's counsel was 
a~ked by the court if he wished to cross-examine and declined. 
The court then remarked: ''Step down (addressing the wit-
ness) . I don't think we will need any further." The district 
attorney then made the same remark, to which the court 
replied ''All right.'' Defendant's counsel remained silent. 
The court then stated that it was murder of the first degree. 
Thereafter when asked by the court whether he had any legal 
cause to show why sentence should not be pronounced, de-
fendant stood mute. The death penalty was imposed. 
There is no question that the evidence is ample to establish 
murder of the first degree, for it was committed while at-
tempting to commit robbery. (Pen. Code, § 189.) [1] De-
fendant's excuse for not offering any evidence on the ques-
tion of penalty is that the court's remark heretofore quoted 
foreclosed such offer. That remark may not necessarily be 
so construed, and the court, as seen, did not only take the 
evidence on the subject consisting of Ainsworth's testimony, 
but also the evidence given at the preliminary hearing which 
went into the details of the crime from the planning of it to 
the flight. Moreover, defendant stood mute when asked if 
he had any legal cause to show why sentence should not be 
pronounced and it was not until then that the death sentence 
was "pronounced." [2] The rule is stated: "In determining 
the degree of an offense and the punishment to be imposed, 
after a plea of guilty, it is the duty of the trial court to con-
sider matters in aggravation as well as in mitigation of the 
offense. The legal significance of established facts may well 
constitute an element of which cognizance is taken in the 
exercise of judicial discretion. A hearing for the determina-
tion of the degree of .an offense and the punishment therefor 
is not a trial in the full technical sense, and is not governed 
May 1951] PEOPLE V. THOMAS 
[37 C.2d 74; 230 P.2d 351] 
bv the same strict rules of procedure as a trial. As stated in 
People v. Williams, 14 Cal.2d 532, 536 [95 P.2d 456] (quoting 
from People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 153, 158 [177 N.E. 739, 
77 A.L.R. 1199] ) it is 'simply a statutory hearing, by which 
the court examined witnesses to determine whether any facts 
existed to aggravate or mitigate the punishment,' and 'in 
considering evidence in aggravation or mitigation of the 
offense the court may consider many matters "not admissible 
on the issue of guilt or innocence" ... ' " (People v. Gilbert, 
22 Cal.2d 522, 528 [140 P.2d 9].) And as said by this court 
in People v. Forbes, 219 Cal. 363, 372 [26 P.2d 466]: "He 
[defendant] cannot now complain that he sat mute with his 
attorneys at his side while evidence of his wicked crime was 
given by the several witnesses. That he offered no evidence, 
if any there was, which was not included in the ample state-
ments and confessions made by himself and Mrs. Nelson, was 
a matter wholly within the control of his attorneys, who might 
have examined each witness at length and, no doubt, could 
have obtained a continuance upon the asking, for the produc-
tion of evidence tending to mitigate the offense, if such ex-
isted." And also what was said in People v. Jackson, 36 Cal.2d 
281, 288 [223 P.2d 236], is applicable: "Finally, there is de-
fendant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion 
in imposing the death penalty upon him. 'rhe contention seems 
pointless. Admittedly the homicide here involved was com-
mitted in the perpetration of a robbery, and as such con-
stituted murder of the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189, People 
v. Bautista, 22 Cal.2d 867, 869 [141 P.2d 417] ; also, People 
v. Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780, 791 [161 P.2d 227] ; People v. Isby, 
30 Cal.2d 879, 888 [186 P.2d 405] .) While defendant urges 
that the killing was 'accidental . . . precipitated by the un-
fortunate attempt of the deceased to wrestle the gun from 
defendant,' and that the 'Probation Officer reported . . . a 
recommendation of life imprisonment,' these same matters 
were fully argued at the hearing to determine the degree of 
murder and the sentence to be imposed therefor. Their 
evaluation in the light of the entire record was for the trial 
court's consideration, and it unquestionably appears that the 
trial court, acting within its discretion and upon a considera-
tion of all the circumstances, fixed the sentence in accordance 
with the statutory authority vested in it.'' 
[3] Authority was not gTanted to the court by the amend-
ment to section 1260 of the Penal· Code to reduce the penalty 
I 
tl 
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from death to life imprisonment in this case for the ''amend-
ment [to § 1260] did no more than bring section 1260 into 
accord with section 1181 ( 6) with respect to reduction of the 
degree of an offense and make clear that the court may reduce 
the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial, when there is 
error relating to the punishment imposed. The test for de-
termining what action should be taken remains the same : was 
there prejudicial error in the proceedings? When, as in this 
case, the trial court is vested with discretion to determine the 
punishment (Pen. Code, § 190), and there has been no error, 
this court has no power to substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court." (People v. Odle, ante, p. 52 [230 P.2d 
345].) There was no error in the proceedings in this case. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
SHENK, J.-I concur in the judgment but I do not agree 
with the very definite suggestion in the majority opinion that 
this court has the power under section 1181 ( 6) or section 1260 
of the Penal Code, even in the presence of error, to reduce 
the punishment and thus commute the sentence from death 
to life imprisonment or any lesser period. That power is 
exclusively vested in the governor of the state by section 1 
of article VII of our Constitution. My views are more fully 
expressed in my concurring opinion in People v. Odle, ante, 
p. 52. 
